Chinese Having a Problem with "Made in China"

by Thomas Huang

"Made in China" is in trouble. From tainted foods to toxic toys, the biggest markets of China's hundreds-of-billion-dollar exports are getting angry with the once-tempting bargains. Yet the most vehement critics of Chinese-made products are perhaps not the "poisoned" Americans, but Chinese themselves.

Senator Hilary Clinton's exuberant yelling at the Democratic debate no doubt resonates with the thoughts of many bothered Americans: "I don't want to eat bad food from China ... or have my children having toys that are going to get them sick!" Of course, Hillary craves for union votes more than anyone else, and at this point, there is really nothing more important than exculpating herself from pro-corporate-interest charges that her rivals (especially Mr. Edwards) had dubbed on her. For that purpose, China, the nemesis of American manufacturing industry, is just a perfect target to pour the blame on.

The criticism to Chinese goods by Senator Clinton and other Democrats comes at a time when the problems of China's products are getting increasingly publicized under international spotlights. Yet all these come late. Defective and counterfeit products proliferated as China transformed from Mao's centrally planned economy to a market-, profit-oriented one. While quality standards of China-made products are raised as the Chinese manufacturers grow more experienced, the problem of lacking effective regulation persisted. In 2003, China's official media, CCTV, launched a weekly news report on consumer goods safety. The Chinese public was shocked at the scary images of nasty scenes in illegal food workshops and contaminated (possibly biohazardous) cotton in apparels and toys, starting to worry if the dishes they just had for dinner are doing anything bad for their health. As a result, similar news investigations flourished on TV channels across the country to meet the curiosity of the populace; earlier this year, in a quest for ratings, a reporter from Beijing even faked a story of "Baozi (a stuffed steamed-bread) made from cardboard-boxes."

So Chinese have this complaint of defective products way before the problem catches the attention of international buyers. Ironically, the reason, at least partly, is that the exported products from China are already way better than the ones sold in domestic markets, because importers from abroad typically care more about quality control than Chinese domestic retailers. Some manufacturers in China even advertise their products as "export grade" to proclaim quality excellence even when they sell them within the country. Still, lower standards in general hurt consumers' faith in the products both in and out of the country. The Chinese complaints were highlighted in the public's responses to a news article of China's official news agency, in which the journalist questioned the Western criticism to Made-in-China products as politically-driven plots, citing statistics from the Japanese government's import inspection agency to demonstrate that exported foods from America are no better, if not worse, than the ones from China in terms of safety-standard violations rate. The points in the article are not totally untenable, but, contrary to the expectation that the Chinese would unite behind their nationalistic pride and say no to foreign critics, responses in the commentary systems of major news websites almost unanimously denounced the article as self-deceptive lies, supporting the outside critics that resonate with their long-time dissatisfactions.

It is hopeless to count on governments alone to crack down on irresponsibly made products. But there are things that government can do. Tougher measures on importer- and retailer-liabilities may help put a brake on the race-to-the-bottom-price that comes at the expense of ignoring safety, even if that means taking a few more nickels from the shoppers' wallets. One thing that the policy-makers must understand is that the foreign importers have much larger bargaining power than their Chinese counterparts thanks to the formers' larger orders. Governments cannot monitor every single order; companies can.

Nonetheless, contrary to the description in protectionist fairy tales about "the prince and princess lived happily ever after without cheap Chinese goods," the developed world may have a hard time paying for low-tech consumer products, had there no deals with countries like China (both the PRC and ROC), Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, which are all more or less subject to similar blames. China taking the most is simply a reflection of its lion's share in manufacturing the goods in the first place. Now the problem is just how to make them safe to touch, to feel, and perhaps, to lick.


*Note: Unless specified, "China" refers to the territories and government of the People's Republic of China, not the Republic of China on Taiwan.
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Why "Status-Quo?"

By Thomas Huang

Early Latin speakers probably did not realize how this phrase has become the ultimate magic spell on every question related to cross-Taiwan Strait relations today: the "status-quo."

It is indeed a peculiar phrase with peculiar meanings. Generally, it refers to the semi-civil-war-like relationship between the two sides of the Strait. On the Mainland, Beijing vigorously contends its sovereignty over Taiwan, the last stronghold of the Republic of China (the government that the PRC claims to have taken the place of), and vows to crush the regime on Taiwan by force if the latter declares outright independence. On the other side of the water, a young democracy is wending its way through the jungle of the ROC's old constitutional framework that still claims the legitimacy to rule the vast Mainland Territory, which encompasses the PRC and Outer Mongolia. For whatever reason, despite the political cataclysm that had occurred on the island, an overwhelming majority of Taiwanese residents favor such ambiguous, up-in-the-air state of cross-strait relations in all of the opinion polls during the last decade. People's logics are simple: if we can remain independent without declaring it, why bother. Plus, it is not all that bad - cross-strait commerce goes on as usual, and more non-stop direct flights are becoming available.

Yet politicians think differently about the messy "status-quo." Washington wants to keep it because it decides that it is best to offend neither side across the Strait. Beijing barely tolerates it as the "less evil" compared to an American intervention in favor of Taiwan. Taiwanese Greens want to fight it, because they fear that maintenance of "status-quo" will enable the PRC to grow strong enough and eventually take over Taiwan, while tying up Taiwan's hands so that it cannot adjust its position to defend itself. For Blues, they simply use it as a shield against the nativistic challenges from the Greens, striving to defend the last bit of space for the legacy of the Republic of China.

Despite the confusions, growls and quarrels, status-quo is perhaps still the more plausible choice for all sides, whether they like it or not. Things do get tricky when neither the definition nor the consequence of such "maintenance" approach is clear, and the Greens (and potentially one day Blues also) are certainly well justified to worry about the potential of a PRC invasion. Yet things can have a more positive outlook.

For a long time, tensions across the strait have remained a matter of pride and prejudice. No one wants to appear self-defeating, as the various versions of nationalistic prides make it hard for any side to bend on the "matters of principle" (原則問題). Meanwhile, protracted hostility has paralyzed people's willingness to learn, to understand and to think from others' perspectives. As a result, in cross-strait politics today, irrationality proliferates when prejudice prevails. Many hypochondriac reactions of Beijing, like the one over the proposal of "Second Republic Constitution" in Taiwan earlier this year, could have been avoided if Beijing is willing to abandon its condescending manner of studying Taiwanese popular opinion so that it can hear the voice of a broader Taiwanese public. PRC "patriots" will probably find the Greens not as evil as they think, either, once they start engaging in dialog with the "traitors" in their eyes. Similarly, the green supporters on Taiwan may also find their perception of the Communist Mainland as a monolithic Juggernaut too much of an overkill, once they embark on an Odyssey to discover the Mainland China they do not know.

However, understanding is always easier said than done, and it will not be an overnight project to rebuild trust between the long separated. Yet a relatively stable political atmosphere is the foremost prerequisite to breaking the ice of misunderstanding. Surely, "status-quo" sets limit to Taiwan's can's and cannot's, but it curbs the Mainland in the same way it disciplines Taiwan. Fear over Taiwan's potentially perilous position in the long run is not unfounded but based on a hardly convincing argument which assumes that "the PRC will never change" - an assertion even the conservatives around me have no faith in. In fact, China is more likely to change in the direction Taiwan wants - more peaceful and tolerant, if Beijing's leaders are shown more about the virtuous side of Taiwan's democratization instead of being reminded all the time that the DPP is a pro-independence party.

With political wisdom, it is entirely possible and worth trying for Taiwan to take advantage of the "status-quo" policy, instead of lamenting about the unjust and unfair treatment it suffers; undue complaints and defiances help nobody but the ultra-nationalists on the Mainland.

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Beijing 2008: More Than Just Olympics

-With Olympics in one year, is China ready to face the challenges from both inside and outside the Games?

by Thomas Huang

August 8^th, Beijing. Nightly fireworks, excited crowds, tireless performers, and of course, loud and uplifting speeches by the country's leaders ... a grand celebration on the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the political heart of China, marked the one-year count down to the 2008 Olympic Games. With new stadiums mushrooming around the city, Beijing is making a sound proclamation of its readiness for the Olympics, a sports carnival that many Chinese have only waited for too long.

For the past six years since the city won the right to stage the 2008 Olympics, preparations for Olympics have catalyzed the making of a brand new Beijing on top of the old dragon-seat of China. Besides unveiling new sports facilities, Beijing is also in a rush to upgrade its grossly outdated infrastructures and teach its residents English and etiquettes. All of these, of course, are backed by the lavish spending of the Chinese central government, wh0se leaders are determined to make the Games "the most successful ones" at all cost.

The open secret is that the Chinese enthusiasm for Olympics has a deeper motive driving in behind: a lust for the aura of international acceptance that the right to host the Games entails. Clearly, a rising China is yearning for the kind of international prestige that matches its economic power. As the most celebrated international sports event that chimes with the lullaby of a harmonic human race, Olympics are just perfect for that purpose, especially since Chinese leaders have repeatedly asserted that the country shall have a "peaceful rise."

China is not alone in capitalizing on the political assets of Olympic Games. Despite popular calls for a separation of sports and politics, Olympics have only grown increasingly politicized over the years. Top leaders of the countries bidding to host the Games become foot soldiers in the campaign work, and decisions that the International Olympic Committee makes on the winners of the bids never fail to attract speculations over their political implications. The recent victory of Sochi's bid for 2014 Winter Olympics, for example, is often viewed as the triumph of an economically and politically rejuvenated Russia seeking to reinstate its position as a world's superpower.

Yet, to China, more politics in Olympics can be both a blessing and a blow. The country benefited from its political potency in winning the bid, and will continue to rally support both domestically and from abroad thanks to the Games. However, there is always a flip side of the coin. When China is placed in the spotlight of international attention, the country's inherent problems, most notably its records on human rights and civil freedom, become the source of squabbles. The country has long been criticized for its brutal suppression of press and religious freedom, ubiquitous internet censorship, and the lack of protection of workers' rights. To many human rights activists, the stark contrast between the spirit of Olympics and the human rights situation in China is simply an irony to the Games. Radical free-Tibet groups called for a boycott of Beijing Olympics; so did US presidential candidate, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. French presidential candidate, Ms. Royal also came down tough on the issue (or, she tried to make it an issue), but she lost anyway. Although, in the name of Olympics, the Chinese government announced at the end of 2006 a policy that eased restrictions on foreign journalists' activities in China, it also set a twenty-one-month lifespan to the new policy, making outside critics doubtful of the government's sincerity in the matter.

China's trouble with critics over the Games is only part of its "growing pains." With industries booming, environmental pollution has always been a headache; and now it gets even trickier as Global Warming kicks in. China's proud economic powerhouse, the export-oriented industries, suffered a hard blow when recent news reports highlighted safety problems of the country's exported products. Besides that, the PRC's strengthening People's Liberation Army is also stirring up concerns, particularly in Pentagon, where many are afraid that the tipping military balance across the Taiwan Strait may lure Beijing into attempts of an armed unification with Taiwan.

Nonetheless, to the Western world, China is not always a counterproductive adversary. The country is still a trading partner, or maybe also a "strategic competitor," as American Democrats agreed on August 7^th's debate, and the wind is unlikely to change in the near future. Chinese leaders have been fairly helpful and cooperative on a number of international issues like dealing with North Korea's nuclear attempts, and the country's increased involvement in UN peace-keeping operations is also much applauded. Many who work in trade and business with China believe that intensified commercial activities will eventually lead to an open society, since modern international economy is based on the flow of capital, goods, service, and most importantly, information. Supporters of China's bid for Olympic share similar beliefs. Former Chair of the House International Relations committee's Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Jim Leach (R-IA), is one of them. He said to the writer of this article in an interview last year that he endorsed Beijing for Olympics because he viewed it as a positive signal that China is welcoming the people of the world to visit and to compete "in fair and open competitions" and "in a totally rule based way."

Behind the disputes over what to do with Beijing Olympics, i.e. to boycott or to participate, given the country's human rights records, the bigger question is essentially an ideological one over the choice in foreign policy-making: which strategy shall we prefer, "containment" or "engagement?"

In public rallies, tough tones whip up the crowds' sentiments. Containment, the tougher approach, is thus always a good choice for policy advertisement. Yet history tells how the strategy worked otherwise. Vietnam War did not crush Viet Cong; isolation failed to shake Cuba; for China, while hostility in the mid-20th century had not move the country any closer to freedom, Nixon's ice-breaking diplomacy opened a new era of China, freer and more open than it had ever been - although still yet to be free enough.

Olympics provide a chance for the outsiders who want to get their voice heard by China, and that is precisely why politicians and human rights activists are trying to take advantage of the event. Yet because of that, Olympics can also an opportunity for China to make some real progress, not only in infrastructure but also in its citizens' rights and freedom, and show it to the world. China's temporary ease on press freedom for foreign journalists for the sake of Olympics may seem half-hearted, yet it is moving in the right direction. The Chinese government may be reluctant to come down harsh on Sudan over Darfur because of oil interests (similarly, Ms. Nancy Pelosi [D-CA], current House speaker, speaks rather gently on human rights issues when it comes to Saudi Arabia), but after international pressure stepped up, China altered its non-interventionist policy and agreed to persuade the Sudanese government into accepting the UN resolution and allowing peacekeeping forces, as long as no sanction against Sudan is proposed.

Making China care more about its image in the world is perhaps the most important way in which Olympics has shaped the regime. To get the Olympic thing running, China needs inputs from the world, and this also makes it easier for the world to communicate with this country that once shielded behind its nationalistic pride. In contrast, confrontational approaches, such as a boycott, serve none of th0se purposes, as they only appear as a cold denial to every tiny bit of things China has done in making itself a more welcomed member of the international community. Just like scolding and beating are not the best ways to discipline a child, iconoclastic attacks, despite the possibly kind-hearted intention in behind, typically hurt more than help the progress.

Some popular notions nowadays compare the 2008 Beijing Olympics to the 1936 Berlin Olympics, accusing both for embellishing suppressive regimes; yet the reality of the present-day China makes such claims hardly tenable. For one thing, China's leaders do not want to demonstrate with Olympics any kind of racial superiority as Adolf Hitler did, nor do they have the ambition to conquer the world, particularly since the nation itself was victimized by an Asian version of holocaust during the WWII. Plus, what the world see in China today is not a bunch of militarily mobilized, war-oriented industries, but a robust market economy intertwined with the rest of the world. All these make the 2008 Olympics by no means comparable to its Berlin counterpart, but instead, more akin to the one in 1988 in Seoul, South Korea, which kick-started genuine democratization in the country after 40 years of military dictatorship.

Now is the time for Chinese leader to move forward. Olympics are perhaps not the panacea for all of China's problems; but, if properly handled, they can be where the solutions start.


Note: In this article, "China" and "Chinese government" refer to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its government, not their Republic of China (ROC) equivalents.
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DPP's Normal Country Resolution: A Challange to Itself?

-DPP's internecine fights over its nominal China policy: not just a war of words.

by Thomas Huang

DPP's presidential candidate for 2008 election, Mr. Hsieh Chang-ting ("Frank") received a hard blow from his own party as the welcome-back gift after his return from a campaign trip to the east coast of the United States.
The party, led by a pro-independence Fire-eater, Mr. Yu Shyi-kun, semi-officially published on August 1^st a draft of the proposed "Normal Country Resolution," which will act as a policy guideline of the party once formally ratified. The draft calls for a transfiguration of Taiwan into a fully functioning, constitutionally independent state instead of trembling in the shadow of ambiguity under its historical name, "Republic of China."


Anyone who knows a bit about the DPP's position would probably find the proclamation little more than a tasteless regurgitation of the party's long-held policy goal of Taiwanese independence. Yet the allusion goes far beyond that. Despite Mr. Yu's "clarifications" that refer to the document as an attempt to secure the party's deep-green (radically pro-independence) votes, the ambitious wordings of the draft has made it a face-to-face confrontation with Mr. Hsieh's moderate stance on the issue.

Mr. Hsieh wants independence, too, no matter what the independence will eventually look like; yet his adept manipulation over the bewildering political nomenclatures makes him a more acceptable choice to lead the island than any other DPP candidates in the eyes of both Beijing and Washington. Of course, in terms of China-friendliness, Hsieh can never match his KMT counterpart, Mr. Ma Ying-jeou^,[1] not to mention that, after winning the party's presidential nomination, he even raised his pitch for moves toward independence to challenge Mr. Ma's loyalty to the island.

Nevertheless, Hsieh is, at heart, a pragmatist. In contrast to the incumbent president, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, who is being overwhelmed by his family's corruption scandals and now desperately trying to boost his job-approval with his idiosyncratic stunts like the recent doomed-to-fail bid for UN membership, Mr. Hsieh has a much better grasp of Beijing's wants and hates. He will, for sure, cling on to the banner of "Taiwanese sovereignty" in front of his DPP supporters; but judging from his history, Hsieh's version of independent Taiwanese state has encompassed little more than the status-quo of Taiwan's de facto independence, which is precisely what Washington wants and what Beijing can tolerate.

The most conspicuous clash between Hsieh and Yu, i.e. whether or not the old name of "Republic of China" would fit a new Taiwanese republic, is highlighted in the DPP's internecine fights over the "Normal Country Resolution." The draft calls for a departure from the "obsession with ROC's Constitution," which seems to take on Mr. Hsieh for his past policy trademark of "conservation of the ROC's Constitutional framework" (Hsien Fa Yi Chung 憲法一中). Although both the DPP party leaders and Hsieh's campaign staff are swift to downplay their divergence for the sake of party unity, their conciliatory words are soon to be lost in the widening ideological disjunction between the fractions of the party. During the primary season earlier this year, Mr. Hsieh was ostracised by all the other three DPP candidates, Mr. Yu one of them, for his seemingly half-hearted commitment to the cause of Taiwanese independence. However, in the end it was Hsieh who won the party's candidacy with a landslide victory in the voting of party members. After all, most Taiwanese, green or blue, do not want war with the mainland. Hsieh's clever maneuvering or even blatant flipflopping over the tricky Mainland-policy issues is the only hope for pan-green supporters to maximize Taiwan's de facto independence while minimizing tensions with Beijing and, potentially, Washington. Mr. Yu and his adherents would commit a major mistake that can cost the party's reelections next year if they ever try to corner Mr. Hsieh into a clarification of his position, instead of letting him maintain a beauty of mystery with the ambiguity in his China policy.


[1] Interestingly, Ma is now backpedaling (hopefully just for now) from his pro-China position to tackle Hsieh's challenge as both parties are trying to curry the favor of the "indigenous" Taiwanese voters. More about this in the future posts. .... Read the full entry